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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an experimental economic study that 
serves two main functions. The first of these is to provide 
a replication of the findings of Schotter and Weigelt: that 
when an equal opportunity or affirmative action program is 
imposed, the effort levels of all employees tend to increase 
and not just the effort of the parties discriminated 
against. Secondly, this study looks into the differences 
between the effort levels shown by men and women in similar 
situations. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that while the effort 
of all individuals is lowered in the presence of 
discrimination, the effort levels of the females drop more 
than male effort levels. 
Three experiments were conducted at Eastern Illinois 
University. The first was a ten round tournament used to 
measure effort levels in the absence of discrimination. The 
second was a ten round unfair tournament with 
discrimination. The final experiment was a twenty round 
unfair tournament with discrimination. 
The results of this set of experiments imply two 
things. The first major result of this study is that the 
i 
work of Schotter and Weigelt was replicated. This provides 
a basis from which to expand into an investigation of the 
area of gender differences in effort levels. This leads to 
the second major result of this research. The experiments 
show that when no discrimination is present there is no 
significant difference between the effort of males and 
females. This research also shows that when a 
discrimination factor is present, women exhibit less effort 
than their male counterparts in some situations. This 
difference is most significant when the women were in the 
disadvantaged category. 
The results of this study provide a good beginning for 
research into the area of gender differences in effort 
levels, which is an area that currently does not have much 
empirical information available. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past thirty years, the use of experimental 
economics as a research method has increased in popularity 
and acceptance. However, it is still a relatively new 
method with many research topics still to be explored 
through laboratory analysis. Experiments have provided a 
way to replicate results that have not been available 
otherwise (Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 44). They also provide 
an inexpensive (relative to the real world) method for 
studying behavior. When conducting experiments it is 
important to first plan out every stage of the experiment 
and determine all that will be needed. This includes the 
experimental design, arranging for colleagues to assist, 
preparation of all the necessary materials, recruiting of 
subjects, and finally conducting the actual experiment 
(Davis and Holt, pp. 55-60}. 
This paper will be a replication and expansion of an 
experiment and research which was originally conducted by 
Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt at New York University 
(1992). Their purpose was to determine if affirmative 
action laws and equal opportunity laws lead to increases in 
the amount of effort exerted by the affected workers. They 
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examined the effects of equal opportunity and affirmative 
action programs through the use of game theory and 
tournaments. 
Schotter and Weigelt theorized that increased effort 
will be displayed by all employees of the firm when either 
equal opportunity or affirmative action programs are 
imposed. If their theory is correct, then there is no trade-
off between equity benefits and the supposed efficiency 
losses. This may occur because both equity and efficiency 
are improved (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992, p. 511). 
This expansion of Schotter and Weigelt's research will 
compare the effort levels of males and females. Schotter 
and Weigelt did not break down their results by subject 
gender to investigate differences. It is expected that when 
faced with the discrimination situation, the females will 
tend to show a decreased level of effort (relative to a non-
discriminatory situation), and their effort will be less 
than the effort that is shown by the males. This hypothesis 
is based on the notion that even though women continue to 
increase in number in the workforce, and receive increasing 
amounts of pay, they are still discriminated against in the 
workplace. This discrimination in turn may result in a lack 
of trying to overcome these obstacles, even when assistance 
is provided through government policy, such as affirmative 
action and equal opportunity laws. 
There is much evidence of discrimination against women. 
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The most obvious is that of pay inequality. Barbara R. 
Bergman found that in the United States the difference in 
wages between white women and men is greater than the gap 
between white men and black men (Cited in Amsden, 1980, p. 
275). Bergman goes on to note that any reduction in the 
discrimination would probably lead to lower wages for the 
men instead of increasing wages for the women (Amsden, p. 
275). This same study also found that employers can either 
gain or lose financially through this type of 
discrimination. When women are discriminated against in 
this manner, their wages are lowered and at the same time 
the wages of men are increased (Amsden, p. 278). The pay 
inequality is shrinking, but the changes are occurring 
slowly. The ratios of women's to men's earnings can be seen 
in Figure 1. 
In addition, there are many social myths regarding 
women in the workplace that are slow to disappear. For 
example, there is the Myth of Role Conflict. This is the 
belief that a "great" conflict will exist for any woman who 
seeks a career outside of her "true vocation" as a housewife 
and mother (Blaxall and Reagan, 1976, p. 33). Barbara Ann 
Stolz (1985) found that within the family environment there 
are many factors that contribute to women having a hard time 
defeating the status quo. For example, childrens' actions 
that, deliberate or not, were effective in keeping their 
mother at home, or the lack of adequate day care provided by 
3 
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Figure 1. Ratio of women's-to-mens's median weekly earnings 
for full-time wage and salary workers by age (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1991, p. 22) 
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society (Stolz, p. 123). Stolz also noted that usually 
women were faced with deliberate attempts by their husbands 
to keep them at home. Also, many responsibilities, such as 
school meetings and sick children, place demands on women 
that cannot be accommodated by the traditional job (Stolz, 
p. 124). These are reasons women may face discrimination in 
the workplace. This can occur in two ways. First, a female 
job candidate may be less likely to be hired than an equally 
(or even less) qualified male candidate because the employer 
may feel that a man is less likely to take time off to care 
for children. The assumption is made that the woman would 
miss more time from work, and therefore be less productive 
for the company. Secondly, a woman may feel penalized at 
work when they do need to take time off. This time off may 
be seen by their male co-workers and bosses as getting a 
break from work to take care of children, a break that the 
males would not take. As a result the women may be 
perceived as not as committed, responsible, or as hard 
working as the males. As a result women may be assigned 
tasks/jobs with lower responsibility, be paid less and 
receive fewer promotions than men do. 
Another major myth is that females suffer from 
motivational deficit and have a lack of commitment to their 
chosen career (Blaxall and Reagan, 1976, p. 35). Jacquelyn 
B. James studied this area and discovered that women allow 
for career interruption (especially during the childrearing 
5 
years) when they are selecting a career (Cited in Grossman, 
l990, p. 106). James found evidence that women who plan to 
interrupt their careers at some point tend to make their 
career choice based on how easy it will be to interrupt 
their career instead of choosing based upon their own 
interests and abilities (Grossman, p. 106). This may lead 
to discrimination situations. The women may be passed over 
for promotions, or not given responsibilities that are given 
to their equivalent male co-workers. As a result of being 
in a job which is not their first choice, women may not try 
as hard to do their best work or exert any extra effort to 
overcome the burdens of discrimination at the workplace. 
Another explanation for any difference in the effort 
levels of men and women is the tendency for women to be 
externalizers (Wallace, 1982, p. 72). This means that they 
attribute things that affect them to luck or chance instead 
of their own actions. Men on the other hand have a tendency 
to be internalizers, which is, they tend to believe that 
events are the result of their own actions. Men are also 
more likely to attribute their success to their actions and 
failure to external events where as women attributed success 
to external factors and failure to their own actions 
(Wallace, p. 72). 
Wallace (1982) states that "women often assume that men 
are more apt to attain promotions and higher management 
positions because of the 'old boys' network' and bias that 
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exists against women" (p. 95). This factor may also 
contribute to the decrease in effort shown by women. If 
they believe that they will not be able to overcome the 
disadvantage, then they may not exert any extra effort to 
attain success in spite of equal opportunity and affirmative 
action programs. 
In this study, tournaments are used to collect data on 
employee effort. In a tournament, subject payments depend 
on their performance relative to that of another subject in 
the experiment. Tournaments can be either symmetric or 
asymmetric. Symmetric tournaments exist when all subjects 
are relatively identical and are treated equally. According 
to O'Keefe, Viscusi, and Zekhauser, 1984, there are two 
types of asymmetric tournaments, uneven and unfair (Cited in 
Weigelt, Dukerich, and Schotter, 1989, p. 23). Tournaments 
are uneven when subjects differ in ability, and are unfair 
when the rules favor one subject over another (Cited in 
Weigelt et al., p. 23). 
Clive Bull found that rank-order tournaments are good 
predictors of the behavior of effort levels of laboratory 
subjects (1987, p. 2). Bull found that disadvantaged 
subjects in uneven tournaments have higher effort levels 
than originally expected (p. 3). In his study, Bull designed 
an experiment that consisted of 10 separate sessions with 
different subjects and parameters for each. The results of 
these tournaments indicate that systematic behavior is shown 
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by subjects in a tournament (Bull, p. 28). This finding is 
important to note for the current study because it allows 
for application and interpretation of the results of the 
current tournament to the outside world. 
The experiments conducted for this paper will be a 
replication of the experiments that Schotter and Weigelt 
conducted. The purpose of this is to establish that 
Schotter and Weigelt's results are replicable and to extend 
their results. The current study will then expand on the 
original study in the interpretation and analysis of the 
data. This study will explore the theory that female workers 
tend to exert less effort than do their male counterparts in 
the same situation. There has been no experimental study 
found which investigates the existence of a difference in 
the effort levels exerted by men and women. If there is a 
notable difference, then a whole new area of investigation 
will be wide open. 
SCHOTTER AND WEIGELT'S WORK 
To perform their experiment, Schotter and Weigelt 
(1992) recruited subjects from economics courses. At the 
beginning of the experiment, subjects were told to select 
envelopes, were given the instructions, and were randomly 
assigned seats, subject numbers, and anonymous tournament 
pair members. Then to start each round, the subjects were 
asked to select a number between o and 100. This was 
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recorded on their sheet as their "decision number" (a proxy 
for their effort level). For each decision number there was 
a corresponding cost, listed on a table that was handed out 
to the subjects. After the subject had recorded his/her 
decision number, he/she opened one of the envelopes he/she 
selected upon entering the room. Each envelope contained a 
random number (a proxy for a random shock), and added it to 
the decision number which gave the subject a total number (a 
proxy for the subject's total output) for the round. This 
information was collected by the experimenter. The member 
of each tournament pair with the highest total number 
received a higher payment than the subject in the pair with 
the lower total number. In the event of a tie a coin was 
tossed to decide which pair member was to be designated as 
having the highest total number. The subjects then recorded 
their payoffs on their sheets. Subjects repeated this 
procedure for 20 rounds. The average duration of the 
experiments was about 75 minutes (p. 518). Seven 
experiments were conducted in all. The first was a 
baseline, symmetric tournament. The second and third were 
unfair tournaments in which one member of each subject pair 
had to exceed the other's output by 25 (or 45) before he/she 
could receive the higher payment. In these two experiments, 
the subject knew if he/she was the disadvantaged pair 
member. Experiments four and five were uneven tournaments 
which were identical to the baseline except that the costs 
.9 
of one pair member is a multiple of the other's. 
Experiments six and seven examine the effects of affirmative 
action programs. This is achieved by combining the 
parameters of experiment 4 with a disadvantage factor of 25 
(experiment 6), and, for experiment 7, the parameters of 
experiment 5 with a disadvantage factor of 45 (p. 522). 
Schotter and Weigelt's results were consistent with the 
predictions of the tournament theory (discussed later in 
this chapter). For their baseline experiment, the mean 
effort level, 77.9, was not significantly different from the 
predicted level of 73.75. The unfair experiment showed that 
while effort levels fell relative to the symmetric 
tournament, they were higher than the theory predicted: the 
mean effort level of disadvantaged subjects was 58.65 
(predicted level 58.39) and the mean effort level of 
advantaged subjects was 74.5 (predicted level 58.39) 
(Schotter and Weigelt, pp. 522-23). Noting the increase in 
mean effort levels (from the unfair tournament to the 
symmetric tournament) , Schotter and Weigelt conclude that 
equal opportunity laws benefit the disadvantaged groups. 
Also, equal opportunity laws actually improve the overall 
tournament performance. These results further suggest that 
the effect of affirmative action programs on output depends 
upon the degree of discrimination that exists (p. 539). 
As a final note Schotter and Weigelt observed two 
behavioral tendencies that were persistent in their 
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research; variance in behavior among the different subjects 
and the slight oversupply of effort. Schotter and Weigelt 
recommended that future research focus on these two areas. 
The main focus of this paper will be in the expansion 
of the results of Schotter and Weigelt along the lines of 
the variance in subject behavior. This will be done to 
determine if men and women exert different levels of effort. 
For this study, some parts of Schotter and Weigelt's 
original work will be eliminated and others will be 
shortened or changed. These changes will be noted as they 
are discussed in the paper. 
For this study there will be three basic null 
hypotheses and alternatives used to test these theories. 
The first null hypothesis is that the data from this study 
are not significantly different from the prediction of game 
theory. The second null hypothesis is that the data from 
this study are not significantly different from Schotter and 
Weigelt's data. The last null hypothesis is that the mean 
effort of males is equal to that of females. 
This thesis will proceed as follows. The theory of 
tournaments will be discussed next. In Chapter 2 the 
experimental procedure and design for this study will be 
presented. Chapter 3 will present and discuss the results. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 conclusions will be drawn and 
suggestions will be made for further research in this area. 
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THE THEORY OF TOURNAMENTS 
The following information deals with the theory behind 
subjects' expected behavior in tournaments, and also in the 
calculation of the payoff functions for the tournaments 
(Schotter and Weigelt, 1992, pp. 514-518): 
Consider the following two-person tournament. Two 
identical agents i and j have the following utility 
functions that are separable in the payment received 
and the effort exerted: 
Udp, e) = u (p) -c (e); 
(1) 
~(p,e) = u(p)-ac(e), 
where p denotes the nonnegative payment to the agent, 
e, a scaler, is the agent's nonnegative effort, and a 
>l is a constant. Note that agent j's costs are a 
times those of agent i, a >1. The positive and 
increasing functions u(.) and c(.) are, respectively, 
concave and convex. Agent i provides a level of effort 
that is not observable and that generates an output ~ 
according to 
12 
Yi = f (ei) + €i, (2) 
where the production function f(.) is concave and €i is 
a random shock. Agent j has a similar technology and 
simultaneously makes a similar decision. The payment 
to agent i is M>O, if Yi>Yi + k, and m<M if Yi<Yi + k, 
where k is a constant. A positive k indicates that j 
is favored in the tournament, while a negative k 
indicates that i is favored. Agent j faces the same 
(actually similar, but mirror image) payment scheme. 
Given any pair of effort choices by agents, agent i's 
probability of winning M, ~(~,~,k), is just equal to 
the probability that (f;-fi) > f (e1) - f (ei) + k. 
i's expected payoff from such a choice is 
Thus, 
while agent j's is (3) 
The above equations specify a game with payoffs given 
by (1) and a strategy set E given by the feasible set 
of effort choices. The theory of tournaments restricts 
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itself to the game's pure Nash equilibria. If the 
distribution of (Ei - E) is degenerate either because 
there are no random shocks to output or because such 
shocks are perfectly correlated across agents, and k is 
not too large, then the game has no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
With suitable restrictions on the distribution of 
random shocks and the utility functions, a unique, pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium will exist. This is the 
behavioral outcome predicted by the theory of 
tournaments. The theory requires the specification of 
the utility function, the production function, the 
distribution of (Ei - Ei), and prizes M and m. One 
simple specification is the following: 
U; ( g, e;) = P; - e// c 
ui (pi, ei) = pi - a.ei2 /c 
1= i,j, 
( 1 ') 
(2,) 
where c>O and E1 is distributed uniformly over the 
interval [-a,+a], a>O, and independently across the 
agents. ~and~ are restricted to lie in [O, 100]. 
In this particular case the agents' expected payoff in 
14 
the tournament is given by 
(3,) 
If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is in 
the interior of [O, 100], each agents first-order 
condition must be fulfilled: 
oEzi 0 • • 2e.· = 1T(ei,e1 ,k) [M-m]-_1 _ = o; 
oei oei c 
oEz1 =o1T(e/,e/,k) a.2e1 • (4) [M-m]- =O. 
oej oe1 c 
The concavity of the agent's payoff function ensures 
that (4) is sufficient for a maximum. (A corner 
solution must be checked for). Given distributional 
assumptions on €i and €1, the probability of winning 
functions with k>O is 
15 
J e,_- k - e1 (e+- k - e/ , if ~-k > e1 
2 -2a-- Ba' 
1 _(z -e, - e, - k - (e, - e, - k)') otherwise, 
~ ~ Ba' 
(5) 
1 - e, + k - elj. (e, + k - eJ' if e;+k > e, 
i ~ 8a' 
1 _p - e, - e; - k - (e, - "i - k)' \_rherwise; 
t ----i;- 8a' i 
with 
01Tj(•) 1 e. - e; + k if ei+k >e;, = - J 
oei 2a 4a2 (6) 
o1Ti (• J 1 _e; - ei + k if ei+k <ei, = 
4a2 oei 2a 
and 
1 
= 
2a 4a2 
(7) 
1 
= 
2a 4a2 
16 
Note that the marginal probability of winning is 
equal for both agents, regardless of the value of k, 
and this probability is a function only of the 
difference in effort levels (including k). It does not 
depend on absolute effort levels. 
Plugging (6) and (7) into (4) and solving for e;· 
and ei·, we find that 
[ (1/2a) - (k/4a 2)] (c(M-m) /2a) 
1 + [(1-a)/4a 2}(c(M-m)/2a) (8) 
When k = o and a = 1, (8) defines the equilibrium 
of a symmetric tournament with 
e;· = e/ = (c(M-m))/4a. (9) 
When a = 1 and k > o, (8) defines the equilibrium 
of an unfair tournament with 
. . 
e;=ei= _1_ 
2a 
k 
4a2 
c(M-m) 
2 
(10) 
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Note in unfair tournaments, despite j's advantage, 
at equilibrium both agents choose the same effort 
level. The logic underlying this result is simple. 
As noted in (6) and (7), the marginal probability of 
winning function for any k and effort levels e 1 and ~ 
are equal for both advantaged and disadvantaged 
subjects and depends only on the difference between 
~ + k and e 1• Because their marginal probability 
winning functions are equal at all e 1 and ~' and both 
i and j have identical cost functions, the same 
effort level that equates the marginal benefits of 
increased effort to marginal costs for i, also does 
so for j. Hence, at equilibrium both choose the same 
effort level. Effort levels fall when k is increased 
from O (i.e., the symmetric equilibrium) because such 
an increase in k decreases the marginal probability 
of winning for both agents at each e 1 and ~-
We compare equations (9) and (10) to investigate 
the effect of equal opportunity laws. The ceteris 
paribus removal of discrimination (k is reduced from 
k>O to k=O} increases the equilibrium effort levels of 
both agents and hence the profits of the tournament 
administrator. Again, the probability of winning for 
agents who are discriminated against increases. 
However, equal opportunity laws can decrease the 
18 
welfare of these agents because they are expected to 
exert more effort at equilibrium. A negative welfare 
gain results if the cost of this increased effort 
exceeds the expected benefits of winning. Welfare gain 
is, of course, always expected to be negative for 
previously favored agents. 
The work in this paper should provide a contribution to 
the area of experimental economics as well as to the area of 
labor economics. This will be accomplished by first 
replicating Schotter and Weigelt's work to provide a basis 
for expanding this work into the area of gender differences. 
If the study shows a significant difference in the effort 
levels that are expended by males and females in various 
situations, the possibilities for further study in this area 
will be numerous. 
19 
CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
All of the experiments for this study used subjects 
recruited from economics courses at Eastern Illinois 
University. The baseline experiment consisted of ten 
subjects, eight others participated in the first 
discrimination experiment, and a third set of ten subjects 
participated in the second discrimination experiment. When 
the subjects arrived at the laboratory (a standard 40-seat 
classroom) they were given a packet of information and asked 
to pick 10 envelopes from a container of 200. In the second 
discrimination experiment, subjects selected 20 envelopes 
from a pile of 240. Inside the envelopes was a number 
written on a slip of paper. The numbers were randomly 
selected from a uniform distribution over the range (-60, 
+60) and were generated using Lotusl23 @functions. Each 
subject was randomly assigned a seat, a subject number, and 
a "pair member" for the duration of the experiment. The 
identity of the pair member was not revealed to the subject 
at any time. 
The packets given to the subjects included written 
instructions, a decision number/costs table, a payoff record 
20 
sheet, and a set of small slips that were collected at the 
end of each round to determine who in the pair was to 
receive the high payment. The instructions and other 
sheets were those used by Schotter and Weigelt in their 
experiments, and were obtained from Dr. Schotter. Copies 
appear in the Appendix of this paper. 
The subjects were told in the instructions that the 
amount of money they earned was a function of their 
decisions, their pair member's decisions, and the 
realization of a random variable. All parameters (including 
if they were the advantaged/disadvantaged member of their 
pairing) in the experiments were known to the subjects 
except for the identity of a subject's pair member. 
The instructions and the format of the experiment was 
explained thoroughly to the subjects, and then the 
experiment began. In all three experiments, subjects were 
told to first select a number from the decision/cost sheet 
which listed numbers between o and 100 (inclusive) and then 
record this number on their payoff record sheet. This was 
their "decision number". Next to each decision number was 
the associated cost of that "effort". After a subject 
recorded his/her decision number and its cost on his/her 
payoff sheet, he/she was instructed to open one of the 10 
envelopes with a random number enclosed. This number was 
then recorded on the payoff sheet and was added to the 
decision number to get a "total number" for that round. 
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This total number was then recorded on one of the small 
slips of paper that were then collected. The "total 
numbers" of each pair were then compared, the experimenter 
then indicated on each slip whether the subject received the 
high or low payment, and the slips were returned to the 
subjects. In the event of a tie (which did not occur in 
any of these experiments) a fair coin would be tossed to 
determine which subject in the pair received the high 
payment. Each subject then circled either the high or low 
payment on his/her payoff record sheet. He/she then 
subtracted the cost of his/her decision number from his/her 
payment amount. This amount is the subject's net payment 
for that round. The decision number in these experiments 
corresponds to effort, the random number corresponds to the 
random shock, the total number corresponds to output, and 
finally the decision cost corresponds to the disutility of 
effort. After this was completed, the next round began. 
The rounds were all identical and the subjects proceeded in 
this manner for 10 rounds in the first two experiments and 
for 20 rounds in the third experiment. After the last round 
was completed, subjects calculated their total payment by 
summing the payments for each round. This payment value was 
then divided by 2 (which the subjects knew was to occur) to 
determine their actual payment in dollars. In the third 
experiment, subjects also then subtracted a $2.00 "fixed 
cost" from the total to determine their actual total 
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payment. (The subtraction of the fixed cost more closely 
replicated Schotter and Weigelt's experiment.) 
The first and second sessions lasted approximately 45 
minutes from start to finish, and the third session lasted 
about 1 hour. 
For the second and third experiments, which had a 
disadvantage factor of 25, the instructions differed 
slightly from those in the baseline experiment. The 
subjects all had identical cost functions, but in each 
subject pair, one person had to realize an output that was k 
units greater than that of his/her pair member in order to 
receive the higher payment. For the experiments, the 
subject in each pair with an even number was the 
disadvantaged subject. The value of the disadvantage 
factor, k (=25), was known to all of the subjects. Here, it 
is important to note a few things. Subjects that received 
the high payment were referred to as "high number subjects" 
instead of "winners". Also, M and m, the high and low 
payments, were not referred to as "prizes" but as "fixed 
payments". The reasoning behind this, according to Schotter 
and Weigelt (1992), was to "deemphasize the gamelike nature 
of the experiment and reduce the possibility that winning 
might affect the decision of subjects independently of 
payoffs" (p. 519). The second thing to note is that the 
subjects were only allowed to participate in one of the 
experiments, not all three. This was to avoid the subjects 
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from having carryover effects from one experiment to the 
other (p. 520). 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Three experiments were conducted to investigate the 
effect of discrimination on the behavior of the subjects. 
The parameters of the experiments can be seen in Table 1. 
The first, baseline, experiment was a symmetric 
tournament that had no disadvantaged members. This would be 
used to measure any changes that show up in the second and 
third experiments. Experiment 2 was to test the effect of 
unfairness, and so, the output of one member of each subject 
pair had to exceed the other member's by 25 before the 
subject could receive the higher fixed payment, M. Since 
this was the only parameter that was changed, the comparison 
with the baseline experiment will illustrate the effects of 
the discrimination treatment (equal opportunity laws). The 
third experiment was identical to the second, except that 
there were twenty rounds instead of ten. 
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TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
EXPERIMENT# DECISION COST RANDOM M m (M-m) EQUILIURIUM 
#RANGE FUNCTION #RANGE ADVANTAGED DISADVANTAGED 
I k=O (0-100) e,'/15000 (-60,60) 2.04 .86 1.18 73.75 73.75 
2 k=25 (0-100) c,'/15000 (-60,60) 2.04 .86 1.18 58.39 58.39 
3 k=25 (0-100) c,2115000 (-60,60) 2.04 .86 1.18 58.39 58.39 
25 
CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
COMPARISON TO THEORY 
The data are summarized in Table 2. These data are 
analyzed to determine if they agree with theory. The 
Wilcoxon test is used for this determination. The Wilcoxon 
test assumes the observations are drawn from a symmetric 
distribution. To test the validity of this observation, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to determine if the data 
could have been drawn from a normal distribution. The K-S 
test is applied to all observations to which the Wilcoxon 
and Mann-Whitney tests are applied (below) . As can be seen 
in Table 3, the hypothesis that the observations are drawn 
from a normal distribution cannot be rejected for any of the 
sets of data. The results from the Wilcoxon test are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. The hypothesis that 
the observations are not significantly different from the 
theoretical effort levels is rejected in three of the seven 
treatments: the overall mean effort levels from the subjects 
in Experiment 1, Experiment 2, and the mean effort level of 
the advantaged subjects in Experiment 2. For the 
disadvantaged subjects in Experiment 2 and all the subjects, 
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Table 2. 
EXRerimental Results: Means and standard deviations 
Mean Decision Numbers Mean standard Deviations 
Experiment Predicted Round Round Round Round Round Round Number of 
Number Effort 1-10 11-20 1-20 1-10 11-20 1-20 Subjects 
1 k=O 73.75 63.95 ----- ----- 30.77 ----- ----- 10 
Male 73.75 66.1 ----- ----- 33.735 ----- ----- 6 
Female 73.75 60.775 ----- ----- 25.376 ----- ----- 4 
2 k=25 58.39 47.0 ----- ----- 34.73 ----- ----- 8 
Male 58.39 62.925 ----- ----- 34.027 ----- ----- 4 
Adv. 58.39 41.1 ----- ----- 27.276 ----- ----- 2 
Dis. 58.39 84.30 ----- ----- 24.881 ----- ----- 2 
Female 58.39 31.08 ----- ----- 27.327 ----- ----- 4 
Adv. 58.39 27.85 ----- ----- 24.164 ----- ----- 2 
Dis. 58.39 ·34.3 ----- ----- 29.813 ----- ----- 2 
3 k=25 58.39 58.96 55.34 57.15 29.78 28.85 29.31 10 
Male 58.39 55.94 55.56 55.75 28 .114 27.84 27.97 9 
Adv. 58.39 54.54 62.76 58.65 26.61 20.93 23.77 5 
Dis. 58.39 57.7 46.55 52.13 29.79 32.42 31.10 4 
Female 58.39 86.1 53.4 69.75 29.44 43.52 36.48 1 
Adv. 58.39 
----- ----- ----- ------ ----- -----
0 
Dis. 58.39 86.1 53.4 69.75 29.44 43.52 36.48 1 
Table 3. 
statistical Test Results 
Experiment K-S Test Wilcoxon(JG-n Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon(M-F) 
Nwnber K... Swn of Ranks (JG vsS&W) Swn of Ranks 
Pos. Neg. ~ Pos. Neg. 
1 k=O .1429* 5 50 2.95* 35 20* 
2k=25 .1486* 0 55 4.35* 53 2 
Adv. .1292* 0 55 4.34* 32 13** 
Dis. .1306* 31 24* -0.19 54 1 
3 k=25 .1132• 107 103* 3.83* 77 133 
Adv. .1186* 125 85* 1.66• 
Dis. .1186* 170 40* 4.34* 47 163 
* indicates a failure to reject the null hypothesis at the .OS level 
** indicates a failure to reject the null hypothesis at the .10 level 
in experiment 3, collectively and separately by 
advantaged/disadvantaged group, the mean effort levels are 
not significantly different from the predicted level. 
THE REPLICATION 
To determine if the results of this study did in fact 
replicate that of Schotter and Weigelt, the Mann-Whitney 
test was performed on the data. This test is used to 
compare data from independent random samples from two 
populations. This is used here to determine if the data 
from the replication experiments are not significantly 
different from the data that was reported by Schotter and 
Weigelt. The test was conducted on the overall mean effort 
levels from all three subject pools and on the mean effort 
levels of the disadvantaged, then advantaged subjects in 
Experiments 2 and 3. In all cases except the disadvantaged 
subjects in Experiment 2, the null hypothesis that the two 
sets of data are not significantly different cannot be 
rejected. The test statistics from the comparison of the 
data from this study with the data of Schotter and Weigelt, 
can be seen in column 5 of Table 3. Figures 2 through 5 
depict the mean effort levels generated by subjects in these 
experiments (JG), Schotter and Weigelt's experiments (SW), 
and the theoretical effort levels. Figure 2 compares the 
mean effort levels for the baseline experiments, and Figure 
3 gives a comparison of mean effort levels of the subjects 
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in the discrimination experiments. Figure 4 presents the 
comparison of mean effort levels of the advantaged subjects 
and Figure 5 the disadvantaged. 
As the statistical tests indicate, this replication of 
Schotter and Weigelt's study proved to be successful and 
will provide a good base from which to expand an 
investigation of the area of the gender differences. 
GENDER COMPARISON 
To see if the differences in effort between the male 
and female groups were significant, the Wilcoxon Test is 
again used. For this test the null hypothesis was that the 
effort of males was not significantly different than that 
shown by the females. As the data recorded in columns 6 and 
7 of Table 3 indicate, this hypothesis fails to be rejected 
in Experiment 1 overall, and for Experiment 2 disadvantaged 
subjects. 
These experiments provide only slight support for the 
theory that males display greater amounts of effort than are 
displayed by females in the face of discrimination. When 
the three sets of experimental results are reviewed 
independently, and with all their individual components, the 
differences in effort between males and females becomes 
obvious. These differences can be seen graphically in 
Figures 6, 7, and 8. Figure 6 depicts a comparison of 
male/female effort levels across all three experiments. In 
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Figure 7, the effort levels of the disadvantaged subjects 
are compared, and in Figure 8 the advantaged. 
The results of the Wilcoxon test, showed that the 
effort levels of the males and females were not 
significantly different in Experiment 1. Perhaps this is 
because in this experiment there was no discrimination 
factor, all subjects were treated equally. For Experiment 
2, the mean effort levels of the male subjects were shown to 
be significantly higher than those exhibited by the female 
subjects. The greatest difference in male/female effort 
levels is seen among the disadvantaged subjects. Among the 
disadvantaged subjects, mean male effort was 84.30 and the 
mean female effort was 34.30. 
For Experiment 3, the Wilcoxon test showed that the 
overall mean effort levels of the males and females were not 
significantly different. This may be partially explained by 
the fact that there was only one female subject 
participating in this experiment (in the disadvantaged 
group) . For this reason a gender comparison could not be 
made among the advantaged subjects in Experiment 3. This 
also partially explains why for the disadvantaged subjects, 
the Wilcoxon test found that the effort levels of the males 
and females was not significantly different. The results of 
this experiment are shown in Figures 6 and 7 which compare 
the mean effort level of the disadvantaged subjects, male 
and female, and the advantaged subjects, male and female. 
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To better incorporate the data of the third experiment, 
the data were combined with that of Experiment 2. The 
Wilcoxon test was run for the combined data (rounds 1-10 
were used) and the null hypotheis that there is no 
significant difference between the effort levels of the 
males and females was rejected. This was tested using the 
.05 level of significance (critical value= 11). This 
showed that in all three cases (male/female overall, 
male/female disadvantaged, and male/female advantaged) that 
there were significant differences in the male and female 
effort levels. When this was completed, the overall mean 
effort levels were 50.93 for males and 43.96 for females. 
For the advantaged males the mean effort level was 41.10 and 
for the females in this category the mean effort level was 
27.85. The large differences are again evident in the means 
for the disadvantaged group. For the males, the mean effort 
level was 84.75, and for the females 34.30. This is shown 
graphically in Figure 9. 
PAYMENTS 
The average payment to the subjects for the first 
Experiment was $5.61. Experiment 2 average payment was 
$6.13, and Experiment 3 was $9.96. The reason that the 
payments are higher for Experiment 3 is because the number 
of rounds was doubled to 20. The average payment for the 
whole set of experiments was $9.84. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
DISCUSSION 
The replication of Schotter and Weigelt was successful 
and provided a base for an investigation into the area of 
gender differences. The study of gender differences gives 
some support to the theory that male effort levels are 
greater than female effort levels when faced with 
discrimination. 
The success of this study occurred in spite of a few 
weaknesses. First of all, due to limited funding the number 
of subjects and the number of rounds for each experiment had 
to remain low. This should not affect the results as far as 
the replication of the work of Schotter and Weigelt, however 
it may have prevented the generation of effort levels that 
matched the predicted levels and therefore, it is a reason 
for caution in the interpretation of the results for the 
comparison of the male/female effort level. Subjects may be 
just learning the game in the first 10 rounds as Schotter 
and Weigelt suggested (1992). It is also important to note 
that all subjects were recruited from economics courses, a 
factor that could cause a slight amount of selection bias in 
the data. This is because females are usually the minority 
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in the field of Economics and those that choose this field 
as a major have already shown a willingness to compete in a 
male dominated area. The results of this set of 
experiments were also affected by the attitudes of the 
subjects themselves. In reading the post experiment 
comments of the subjects, it was found that several of the 
subjects just picked any decision number without giving the 
choice any thought because they figured that they were going 
to make money no matter what number they picked. However, 
none of these subjects decided to "drop out" (choose zero 
effort level) for the duration of the tournament. 
Another factor to consider is the lower payoffs in this 
study compared to Schotter and Weigelt's study. In spite of 
this, most subjects were happy to participate in the study 
and commented that they were receiving more than (in the 
majority of cases twice as much as) the minimum wage for the 
amount of time that the experiments took. This appeared to 
be an adequate incentive for the subjects. All of these 
factors, individually and in combination, may have had an 
effect on the results with respect to Schotter and Weigelt's 
theory and study. Nevertheless, in the end, this 
replication supports of the work of Schotter and Weigelt. 
In the case of the gender differences in the effort 
levels, this study weakly supports the theory that females 
have lower effort levels when faced with a discrimination 
factor but not when treated equally. The fact that the 
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workforce is changing, becoming more accepting of and more 
fair to, women may cause the effort levels of men and women 
to equalize, but it may take a long time before all the 
myths and stereotypes which lead to discrimination can be 
eliminated from the minds of workers and employers. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that further research be conducted in 
this area. The findings here are a good start for an 
investigation into the comparison of male and female effort 
levels. It should prove to be an important area in Labor 
Economics. 
A key point to mention is that if experiments such as 
these are conducted, the research should be done as closely 
to the original methods that were used by Schotter and 
Weigelt for their study. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix contains all the forms that were used to 
complete all three experiments in this study. They are 
based upon those that were used and provided by Dr. Schotter 
for his original study. 
The order of the forms is as follows: 
Instructions for Baseline 
Instructions for Unfair Experiments 
Sheet 1 
Sheet 2 
Decision Cost Table 
Payoff Record Sheet 
Payout Record Sheet 
Post Experiment Survey 
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Session#~~~~ Subject#~~~~~ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you could earn money which will be paid 
to you in cash. 
As you read these instructions, you will be in a room with a 
number of other subjects. Each subject has been randomly 
assigned a subject number, which is located on the top right 
of this sheet. The experiment consists of a number of 
decision rounds. In each decision round, you will be paired 
with another subject by a random drawing of subject numbers. 
This will be called your pair member. Note that your pair 
member will be the same subject throughout the entire 
experiment. The identity of your pair member will not be 
revealed to you, nor will your identity be revealed to your 
pair member. 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
In the experiment you will perform a simple task. Attached to 
these instruction sheets are two other sheets, labelled sheet 
1 and sheet 2. Sheet 1 shows 101 numbers, from o to 100 in 
column A. These are your decision numbers. Associated with 
each number is a decision cost, which is listed in column B. 
Note that the higher the decision number chosen the greater is 
the associated cost. 
Your pair member has an identical sheet. In each round of the 
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experiment, you and your pair member will each select a 
decision number separately. Record your number in column 1 of 
sheet 2 and record its associated cost in column 5 of sheet 2. 
Upon entering this room, all subjects randomly selected 10 
envelopes from a container holding hundreds of envelopes. 
Each envelope contains a written number, whose value will fall 
between -60 and +60. A series of numbers between -60 and +60 
was randomly selected by a computer program, with each number 
having an equal probability of being selected. Each of these 
numbers was then written on a sheet of paper, and put into an 
envelope. After you have selected your decision number, and 
recorded it AND its cost on sheet 2, select one of your 
envelopes, open it, and record its enclosed number in column 
2 of sheet 2. Then write this information on the slips of 
paper that were provided to you. These will then be 
collected. 
CALCULATION OF PAYOFFS 
Your payment in each round of the experiment will be computed 
as follows. You will add your decision number, and random 
draw number, and record this sum in column 3 of sheet 2. Your 
pair member will do the same. 
Since all subjects have worked in privacy, the experimenter 
will then compare the totals of you and your pair member 
(which are on the slips of paper collected). If you have an 
even subject number, then your pair member will always have an 
odd subject number, and vice versa. 
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Your payoff (which is expressed in experimental dollars, E$) 
is then determined. 
Note: to convert experimental dollars to us dollars, 
simply divide the experimental dollar value by 2. 
PAYOFF DETERMINATION 
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's, you 
receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04). 
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's, you 
receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86) 
If your column 3 total is equal to your pair member's, your 
fixed payment will be either "X" (E$2.04) or "Y" (E$0.86). 
Which payment you receive will be determined by the flip of a 
fair coin. Circle the appropriate fixed payment in column 4, 
and subtract from column 4 the cost associated with your 
decision number listed in column 5. Record this difference in 
column 6. This amount in column 6 is your earnings for the 
round. The earnings of your pair member are calculated in 
exactly the same way. After round one is completed, you will 
perform the same procedure. That is, you will choose a 
decision number again (though of course, you may pick the same 
one), you will open another envelope and record your random 
draw number for the round, and you will calculate a new 
payoff. When round 10 is completed, add your earnings from 
each of the rounds and record the total earnings at the bottom 
of sheet 2. Then divide by 2 and this will be the amount that 
will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
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Session# 
~~~- Subject#~~~~~ 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you could earn money which will be paid 
to you in cash. As you read these instructions, you will be 
in a room with a number of other subjects. Each subject has 
been randomly assigned a subject number, which is located on 
the top right of this sheet. 
The experiment consists of a number of decision rounds. In 
each decision round, you will be paired with another subject 
by a random drawing of subject numbers. This will be called 
your pair member. Note that your pair member will be the same 
subject throughout the entire experiment. The identity of 
your pair member will not be revealed to you, nor will your 
identity be revealed to your pair member. 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
In the experiment you will perform a simple task. Attached to 
these instruction sheets are two other sheets, labelled sheet 
1 and sheet 2. Sheet 1 shows 101 numbers, from O to 100 in 
column A. These are your decision numbers. Associated with 
each number is a decision cost, which is listed in column B. 
Note that the higher the decision number chosen the greater is 
the associated cost. Your pair member has an identical sheet. 
In each round of the experiment, you and your pair member will 
each select a decision number separately. 
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Record your number in column 1 of sheet 2 and record its 
associated cost in column 5 of sheet 2. 
Upon entering this room, all subjects randomly selected 10 
envelopes from a container holding hundreds of envelopes. 
Each envelope contains a written number, whose value will fall 
between -60 and +60. A series of numbers between -60 and +60 
was randomly selected by a computer program, with each number 
having an equal probability of being selected. Each of these 
numbers was then written on a sheet of paper, and put into an 
envelope. After you have selected your decision number, and 
recorded it AND its cbst on sheet 2, select one of your 
envelopes, open it, and record its enclosed number in column 
2 of sheet 2. Then write this information on the slips of 
paper that were provided to you. These slips will then be 
collected along with the randomly drawn number and its 
envelope. 
CALCULATION OF PAYOFFS 
•· 
Your payment in each round of the experiment will be computed 
as follows. You will add your decision number and random draw 
number, and record this sum in column 3 of sheet 2. Your pair 
member will do the same. Since all subjects have worked in 
privacy, the experimenter will then compare the totals of you 
and your pair member (which are on the slips of paper 
collected). If you have an even subject number, then your 
pair member will always have an odd subject number, and vice 
versa. Your payoff (which is expressed in experimental 
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dollars, E$) is then determined. 
Note: to convert experimental dollars to US dollars, 
simply divide the experimental dollar value by 2. 
IF YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER IS ODD 
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's, you 
receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04). 
If your column 3 total is not more than 24 less than your pair 
member's, you receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04). 
If your column 3 total is 25 less than your pair member's, a 
fair coin will be flipped to determine whether you receive 
fixed payment "X" (E$2.04) or "Y" (E$0.86). 
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's by 26 
or more, you receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86). 
NOTE: Your column 3 total can be up to 25 less than your pair 
member's, and you will still receive the fixed payment "X" 
(E$2. 04) . 
IF YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER IS EVEN 
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by 
26 or more, your receive fixed payment "X" ( E$2. 04) . 
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by 
25, a fair coin will be flipped to determine whether you 
receive fixed payment "X" (E$2.04) or "Y" (E$0.86). 
If your column 3 total is greater than your pair member's by 
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24 or less, you receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86). 
If your column 3 total is less than your pair member's you 
receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0.86). 
NOTE: You will receive fixed payment "Y" (E$0. 86) unless your 
column 3 total is 25 or more greater than your pair member's 
column 3 total. Circle the appropriate fixed payment in 
column 4, and subtract from column 4 the cost associated with 
your decision number listed in column 5. Record this 
difference in column 6. This amount in column 6 is your 
earnings for the round. The earnings of your pair member are 
calculated in exactly the same way. After round one is 
completed, you will perform the same procedure. That is, you 
will choose a decision number again (though of course, you may 
pick the same one) , you will open another envelope and record 
your random draw number for the round, and you will calculate 
a new payoff. When round 10 is completed, add your earnings 
from each of the rounds and record the total earnings at the 
bottom of sheet 2. Then divide by 2 and this will be the 
amount that will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment. 
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SUBJECT# __ 
SHEET 1 - DECISION COSTS TABLE 
Column A Column B Column A ColumnB Column A Column B 
Decisioe Cost of Decision Cost of Decision Cost of 
Number Decision Number Decision Number Decision 
0 S0.0000 36 $0.086 72 $0.346 
I S0.0001 37 $0.091 73 $0.355 
2 S0.0003 38 $0.096 74 $0.365 
3 S0.0006 39 $0.101 75 $0.375 
4 S0.001 40 $0.107 76 $0.385 
5 S0.002 41 $0.112 77 $0.395 
6 S0.003 42 $0.118 78 $0.406 
7 $0.004 43 $0.123 79 $0.416 
8 S0.005 44 $0.129 80 $0.427 
9 S0.006 45 $0.135 81 $0.437 
10 $0.007 46 $0.141 82 $0.448 
11 S0.008 47 $0.147 83 $0.459 
12 S0.010 48 $0.154 84 $0.470 
13 SO.Oil 49 $0.160 85 $0.482 
14 S0.013 50 $0.167 86 $0.493 
15 S0.015 51 $0.173 87 $0.505 
16 S0.017 52 $0.180 88 $0.516 
17 S0.019 53 $0.187 89 $0.528 
18 S0.022 54 $0.194 90 $0.540 
19 S0.024 55 $0.202 91 $0.552 
20 S0.027 56 $0.209 92 $0.564 
21 S0.029 57 $0.217 93 $0.577 
22 S0.032 58 $0.224 94 $0.589 
23 S0.035 59 $0.232 95 $0.602 
24 S0.038 60 $0.240 96 $0.614 
25 S0.042 61 $0.248 97 $0.627 
26 S0.045 62 $0.256 98 $0.640 
27 S0.049 63 $0.265 99 $0.653 
28 S0.052 64 $0.273 100 $0.667 
29 S0.056 65 $0.282 
30 S0.060 66 $0.290 
31 S0.064 67 $0.299 
32 S0.068 68 $0.308 
33 S0.073 69 $0.317 
34 S0.077 70 $0.327 
35 S0.082 71 $0.336 
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ROUND I 
Col. 1 Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
Col.3 
TocaJ 
1 + 2 
SHEET 2 - PAYOFF RECORD SHEET 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
+ ES2.04 ES0.86 -
ROUND2 
Col. 1 Col.2 Col.3 
Decision Random T ocaJ 
Number Number 1 + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
+ E$2.04 ES0.86 -
ROUND3 
Col. I Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
Col.3 
TocaJ 
1 + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
+ ES2.04 ES0.86 -
ROUND4 
Col. I Col.2 Col.3 
Decisioo Random T ocaJ 
Number Number 1 + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
+ ES2.04 ES0.86 -
ROUNDS 
Col. I Col.2 
Decisioo Random 
Number Number 
+ 
Col.3 
Total 
I + 2 
Col.4 
x y 
Amt. Amt. 
ES2.04 ES0.86 -
Col.S Col.6 
Minus Total 
Cost Earned 
Subject# __ 
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ROUND6 
Col. l Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
+ 
ROUND? 
Col. l Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
+ 
ROUNDS 
Col. l Col.2 
Decision Randcm 
Number Number 
+ 
ROUND9 
Col. l Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
+ 
ROUND 10 
Col. l Col.2 
Decision Random 
Number Number 
+ 
Col.3 
Total 
l + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
E$2.04 E$0.86 -
Col.3 
Total 
l + 2 
Col.4 
x y 
Amt. Amt. 
Col.S Col.6 
Minus Total 
Cost Earned 
E$2.04 ES0.86 -
Col.3 
Total 
l + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
E$2.04 ES0.86 -
Col.3 
Total 
l + 2 
Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
X Y Minus Total 
Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
E$2.04 E$0.86 -
Col.3 Col.4 Col.S Col.6 
Total x y Minus Total 
l + 2 Amt. Amt. Cost Earned 
E$2.04 E$0.86 -
Sum of Total Earnings Rounds 1-10 ES __ 
Divide by 2 to get Net Earnings $ __ 
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DATE. ___ _ 
Subject payments for experiments 
conducted by JoAnnc E. Oucnnewig 
Faculty Advisor: Tim Mason 
I I NAME (PRINT) 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
SESSION# __ _ 
PAYOUT RECORD SHEET 
I SS or Student ID # I Payment I Signature I 
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POST EXPERIMENT SURVEY 
Thank you for participating in this study. Please feel free 
to make any comments you have about the experiment, both good 
and bad, so that adjustments may be made and it can be 
improved for future use. 
participation. 
Once again, thank you for your 
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